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Abstract. we propose a fairness property called P-monotonicity
that we would like a matching mechanism to satisfy. We show
that it is impossible to have a mechanism which is both stable and
P-monotonic. Moreover, we show that it is impossible to have a
mechanism which is both eﬃcient and P-monotonic.
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1. Introduction
Since the initiation of the theory of two-sided matching by Gale and Shap-
ley (1962), it has been successfully used in designing real world markets like
labor and education markets1. A central solution concept used in the litera-
ture is stability. A matching mechanism is stable if no agent from any side of
the market is matched to unacceptable allocation and if there exist no pair of
agents who would prefer to be matched to each other than to their current as-
signed allocations. Stability is also empirically important since Roth (2002)
ﬁnds that markets which adopted stable matching mechanisms have mostly
succeeded while those who adopted not stable matching mechanisms have
mostly failed. Nevertheless, there are some impossibility results about the
existence of a matching mechanism that satisﬁes stability and other required
properties like strategy proofness (Roth 1982), Non bossiness (Kojima 2010)
1For student assignment systems reforms, see Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003), Abdulkadiroglu,
Pathak, and Roth (2005) for the US, Biró (2008) for Hungary, and Selim and Salem (2010) for
Egypt.
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and non damaging bossiness (Matsubae 2010). In this note, we propose an-
other fairness property that we would like matching mechanisms to satisfy,
which is P-monotonicity. It simply requires that if a student s becomes more
popular2 for at least one college c, then s and c should not end up with a
worse allocation3. Our proposed notion is closely related to Balinski and
Sönmez (1999) notion of respecting improvement. A mechanism respects im-
provement if a student s is ranked higher by any college c, then s becomes
weakly better oﬀ4. The incentive for proposing P-monotonicity is that if we
take into account the possibility that c might end with a worse allocation
than this may invite c to strategically manipulate its preference list5, but
if we require that c becomes weakly better oﬀ then it has no incentive to
misreport its preference list. Unfortunately, it turns out that it is impossible
to have a mechanism satisfying stability and P-monotonicity. Moreover, it
is impossible to have a mechanism satisfying eﬃciency and P-monotonicity.
2. Model
We consider a one-to-one matching problem between students and colleges.
Let S and C be two ﬁnite disjoint sets of students and colleges, respectively.
Each student s ∈ S has a strict preference relation s over C∪{s}, similarly
Each college c ∈ C has a strict preference relation c over S ∪ {c}. Let
= (i)i∈S∪C denotes the set of all possible preferences for i. A matching is
a mapping µ from S∪C to S∪C such that: (i) for each c ∈ C, µ(c) = s∪{c}
and for each s ∈ S, µ(s) =c ∪ {s}. (ii) for each (s, c) ∈ S × C , µ(c) = s
if and only if µ(s) = c. A matching µ is said to be individually rational
if for all i ∈ S ∪ C either µ(i) i i or µ(i) = i. A matching µ is blocked
by a pair (s, c) ∈ S × C if c s µ(s) and s c µ(c). If µ is not blocked
and individually rational, then it is stable. Also, a matching is eﬃcient6 if
there exists no matching µ
′
such that µ (i)
′
%i µ (i) for all i ∈ S ∪ C, and
there exists µ (i)
′ i µ (i) for at least one i ∈ S ∪ C. We denote the set
of all possible matchings over S ∪ C by M. A matching mechanism is a
function φ mapping from  toM. A matching mechanism φ is stable if for
any preference proﬁle it produces a stable matching φ(). Gale and Shapley
(1962) show that there will always exist a stable matching mechanism and
they proposed the Deferred acceptance algorithm to ﬁnd it7. Similarly, A
matching mechanism φ is eﬃcient if for any preference proﬁle it produces
2Becoming more popular means that she moves at least one rank in the preference list of at least
one college.
3Note that the deﬁnition is symmetric between students and colleges.
4Balinski and Sönmez (1999) show that the student optimal stable mechanism respects improve-
ment.
5See Roth (1982) for the manipulability of stable mechanisms and Alcalde and Barberà (1994)
and Sönmez (1994) for the manipulability of eﬃcient mechanisms.
6In a Pareto sense.
7See Roth (2008) for a survey on the Deferred acceptance algorithm .
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an eﬃcient matching φ(). An example of an eﬃcient mechanism is the Top
trading cycle mechanism proposed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003).
3. Results
We propose a fairness criterion called P-monotonicity which we would like
matching mechanisms to satisfy. For all i, j ∈ S ∪ C, Fix a j∗and let P j∗i
denotes a speciﬁc preference list of i over j∗ (i.e. the order that j∗ takes
in i's preference list). Similarly, let P˜ j
∗
i denotes a diﬀerence preference list
of i over the same j∗. Now let P j
∗
i be the set of all possible preference lists
of i over j∗ such that P j
∗
i , P˜
j∗
i ∈ P j
∗
i . Deﬁne Rj∗to be a weak preference
relation of j∗over P j
∗
i where (P˜
j∗
i )Rj∗(P
j∗
i ) means that j
∗ weakly prefers her
order in i's preference list P˜ j
∗
i than to her order in i's preference list P
j∗
i .
Deﬁnition 3.1. Amatching is P-monotonic if (P˜ j
∗
i )Rj∗(P
j∗
i ), then µ˜ (j
∗) %j∗
µ (j∗), and µ˜ (i) %i µ (i).
It means that if j∗ moves at least one rank in the preference list of any
i, then j∗ and i should not end up with a worse allocation according to j∗'s
and i's preference lists, respectively. A mechanism φ is P-monotonic if for
every preference proﬁle in  and every preference proﬁle in P j∗i the matching
resulting φ(,P j∗i ) is P-monotonic.
Theorem 3.2. There does not exist a matching mechanism that is stable and
P-monotonic.
Proof. Consider a 2 × 2 market with the following preferences for colleges
and students, c1 : s1, s2,∅;c2 : s2, s1,∅;s1 : c2, c1,∅;s2 : c2, c1,∅. The
preference list for s2 simply means that she prefers to be matched to college
c2, then to be matched to college c1, then to be unmatched
8. There exists a
unique stable matching:
µ :
(
c1 c2
s1 s2
)
Where s2 and c1 are getting their top choices. Now assume that s2 changes
her preference list to ′s2 : c1, c2,∅9, then we have two stable matchings:
µ
′
1 :
(
c1 c2
s2 s1
)
µ
′
2 :
(
c1 c2
s1 s2
)
8∅ denotes being unmatched.
9Note that ′s2 is not a false preference list, but it is s2 new preference list where c1 becomes
more popular for s2.
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Under µ
′
1, c1 is allocated to its second preference and, under µ
′
2, s2 is al-
located to her second preference. Hence the mechanism is stable but not
P-monotonic.

Our second result checks whether we can have an eﬃcient and P-monotonic
matching.
Theorem 3.3. There does not exist a matching mechanism that is eﬃcient
and a P-monotonic.
Proof. Consider a 2 × 2 market with the following preferences for colleges
and students, c1 : s1, s2,∅;c2 : s2, s1,∅;s1 : c1,∅;s2 : c2,∅. Then the
eﬃcient matching we have is unique:
pi :
(
c1 c2
s1 s2
)
Note that s1 and c2 are getting their top choices. Now let s1 changes his
preference list to ′s1 : c2, c1,∅. Then we have two eﬃcient matchings:
pi
′
1 :
(
c1 c2
s1 s2
)
pi
′
2 :
(
c1 c2 ∅
∅ s1 s2
)
Under pi
′
1, s1 is allocated to his second preference, and under pi
′
2, c2 is al-
located to its second preference. Hence the mechanism is eﬃcient but not
P-monotonic.

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